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I. INTRODUCTION
This legislation springs from one of our most essential principles:
a democracy works best when the people have all the information that
the security of the [n]ation permits. No one should be able to pull
curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without
injury to the public interest.'

With this statement over thirty years ago, President Lyndon B.
Johnson signed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)2 into law.
Although the Act had lofty goals, neither the President nor Congress could
have realized, in 1966, the problems that would result once the Act was
applied to the myriad of government operations. One of these problems,
especially important since the 1980s, is whether to apply the Act to private
entities. This issue is important because, as government agencies turn to
private entities in order to function more efficiently, 4 courts have had to
deal with FOIA requests for information relating to the government but
created or possessed by entities not explicitly covered under the Act.5
Debates therefore have developed regarding the benefits and drawbacks of
6
privatization, including its effects on freedom of information.
As privatization of government services continues into the late 1990s,
some commentators worry that the desire for government efficiency will
cause information
that is important to the public to become shrouded in
7
secrecy. Commentators say unless Congress amends the FOIA to ensure
1. Statement by the President upon Signing Bill Revising Public Information
Provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 887, 895 (July
11, 1966).
2. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552).
3. See Nicole B. Cisarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle in Privatized
Federal Corrections: The Need for Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. MIcH. J.L.
REFORM 249 (1995); Matthew D. Bunker & Charles B. Davis, Privatized Government
Functions and Freedom of Information: Public Accountability in an Age of Private
Governance 1-7 (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Federal Communications
Law Journal).
4. See, e.g., Cdsarez, supra note 3, at 249-64 (discussing federal government efforts to
privatize prisons); Bunker & Davis, supra note 3, at 5 (discussing the various private entities
handling government operations).
5. See, e.g., Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 (1980); Washington Research Project,
Inc. v. Department of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
6. Compare Bunker & Davis, supra note 3 with Joseph F. Caponio & Janet Geffner,
Does PrivatizationAffect Access to Government Information?, 5 Gov'T INFO. Q. 147 (1988)
(discussing the benefits of federal privatization when used properly as a management tool).
7. See, e.g., Cisarez, supra note 3 (suggesting that private prison operators must
beheld accountable, and thus the public must have access to private prison records); Jane

Number 1]

PRIVATIZATIONAND THE FOIA

that private entities performing government functions fall within its reach,
courts must come forward to protect the public's right to know because
privatization is affecting a wide variety of services and operations
associated with the federal government. 8 These services include prison
operations,9 the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),'0
medical research," and railroad operations. 2 As the federal government
contracts with private entities to handle these services, citizens are finding
it very difficult to obtain important information related to the government
because these private entities often do not fall under the definition of
"agency" in the FOIA.13 Additionally, the Act does not define the term
"agency records," and private entities may not be holding records with a
sufficient nexus to the government to qualify as agency records under
judicial analysis. 14 Thus, federal government privatization can have a
substantial impact on important information that was public while in the
government's hands but becomes secret once it is farmed out to private
entities.
The purpose of this Article is to discuss what definition of "agency"
and "agency record" best protects the public's right to know and retains the
spirit of the FOIA in light of the government's privatization efforts. This
Article discusses the federal government's privatization efforts and how
they have been handled in the federal courts dealing with requests under
the FOIA. This Article analyzes the definition of "agency" under the Act,
as well as the judicial interpretations of what constitute "agency records,"
followed by a detailed analysis of the federal court opinions applying these
terms to private entities dealing with the federal government. This Article
concludes with an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the various
court approaches, including a discussion of how they square with the stated
Kirtley, Remarks at the Meeting of the Florida Sunshine Summit Regarding Access and
Privatization in Public Hospitals (Oct. 17, 1997), (transcript, on file with Federal
CommunicationsLaw Journal);Bunker & Davis, supra note 3.
8. See generallyC~sarez, supra note 3; Bunker & Davis, supra note 3.
9. See generally PRIVATZING CORRECTIONAL INsTrTUTONs (Gary W. Bowmant, et al.
eds. 1993); Cdsarez, supra note 3.
10. See, e.g., Caponio & Geffner, supra note 6, at 150.
11. See, e.g., Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 (1980).
12. See, e.g., Ehm v. National Ry. Passenger Corp., 732 F.2d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir.
1984) (holding that it is unclear whether Congress intended to include Amtrak in its
definition of "agency" under the FOIA); Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 580 F. Supp. 777 (D.D.C. 1984).
13. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (Supp. II 1996); see also Katherine A. Meyer & Allan R.
Adler, Agency, in LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS 190-93 (Allan
R. Adler ed., 1997); Cdsarez, supra note 3.
14. See, e.g., Ann H. Wion, Note, The Definition of "Agency Records" Under the
Freedom of InformationAct, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1093 (1979).
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legislative purposes behind the Act. This Article then suggests an approach
that best comports with the spirit of the FOIA and can be applied to federal
privatization efforts in the future.

II. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PRIVATIZATION EFFORTS
Several types of privatization are undertaken by state and federal
governments in the United States. For example, the federal government
engaged in "load shedding" by cutting social welfare programs and
allowing private for-profit or not-for-profit companies to take over the
programs. Government subsidies allow consumers to choose private
entities through
a voucher system, such as in the federal food stamp
16
program. The most common form of privatization, however, is
"contracting out," where former government functions are delegated to
17
private entities through a contract.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, media professionals have made
their voices heard regarding the potential impact of privatization,
particularly contracting out, on access to government information.'5
Communications law scholars also express concern that important
government functions, such as the safeguarding of federal prisoners, are
- 19
now shielded from the public through the use of private companies.
Because of the importance of these government services, commentators
believe that a lack of oversight due to the failure of the FOIA to reach these
entities poses a very real danger to the public.20 This danger is likely to
grow in the future as governments continue to seek more efficient ways to
provide services, perhaps at the expense of constitutional protections.2 ,
Unless Congress or the courts craft liberal definitions of "agency" and
15. See Bunker & Davis, supra note 3, at 7.

16. See id.
17. See id.; see also Shirley L. Mays, Privatizationof MunicipalServices: A Contagion
in the Body Politic, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 41, 43 (1995).
18. See, e.g., Elliot Krieger, PrivatizationRaises Issues of Accountability, PROVIDENCE
J.-BuLL., Dec. 15, 1996, at 7B.
19. See generally C~sarez, supra note 3; Bunker & Davis, supra note 3.
20. See Cisarez, supra note 3, at 257-58, 263-64 (arguing that privatization of federal
prisons can result in corruption and the exploitation and mistreatment of inmates, because
the public cannot monitor the activities of private companies that are not subjected to the
FOIA); see also Mays, supra note 17, at 45-46 (discussing the fact that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to private entities and arguing that a
state action approach should be applied by the courts in order to force private companies to
comply with due process).
21. See Mays, supra note 17, at 45 (discussing the lack of due process protections in
privately-run businesses); Bunker & Davis, supra note 3, at 5 (citing several examples of
disputes between private entities and the public over access to information and arguing that
these disputes have been a growing trend).
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"agency records" under the FOIA, it is possible that simply by filtering
records out of their possession, federal agencies can circumvent the Act
and its spirit of open government.
One frequently debated area of federal privatization has been the
trend toward privatized federal prisons. Commentators suggest that due to
the rising costs of housing inmates and persistent overcrowding, the
government increasingly has turned to private prison operators since the
Reagan era in the 1980s. 22 In fact, as of 1996, state and federal private
prisons house as many as 74,000 inmates, with an annual growth rate of
over thirty percent expected in the next
•
2 4 several years.2 Because federal
legislation allows private federal prisons, this trend led to worries over the
quality of services being offered by private companies, as well as the
treatment of inmates by private operators.25
Commentators worry that private prisons will allow operators to take
liberties with prisoners that would not be allowed by the government. 26
Additionally, private prison operators that are not subject to public
oversight could operate against the public's interest by taking a more
relaxed approach with such important functions as security measures.27
Private prison operators have a financial motive and may sacrifice
individual constitutional rights and prison quality in the name of the profits

22. See, e.g., Warren L. Ratliff, The Due Process Failure of America's Prison
PrivatizationStatutes, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 371, 375 (1997). For a discussion of the
issues involved in privatization of prisons, as well as the chronological development of
private prison industries in various states, see BARBARA J. AuERBACH Er AL., WORK IN
AMERICAN PRISONS: THE PRIvATE SECTOR GETs INVOLVED (1988).
23. See Ratliff, supra note 22, at 372. In fact, the Clinton administration endorsed
federal prison privatization in order to look "tough" on crime and reduce the federal deficit.
See id. at 404-05. At least 21 federal private prison facilities currently exist. See id. at 405.
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 4013 (1994).
25. See Ratliff, supra note 22.
26. See id. at 373; see also IRA P. ROBBINS, THE LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE
INCARCERATION 2-5 (1988) (arguing that districts contemplating privatization of prisons
must ensure accountability to the government, public, and inmates to protect the
constitutional rights of the public and of inmates). This study by the American Bar
Association was conducted as a follow-up to the Association's 1986 recommendation that
"jurisdictions that are considering the privatization of prisons and jails not proceed... until
the complex constitutional, statutory, and contractual issues are satisfactorily developed and
resolved." Id. at 6.
27. An Associated Press writer, writing on the 30th anniversary of the FOIA in 1997,
commented that private entities performing public functions need to understand that their
work will be subject to public scrutiny. See Bob Rivard, 30th Anniversary of Freedom of
Information Act Is Time to Reflect, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., May 12, 1997. Rivard
pointed out that the escape of a convicted murderer from a privately-rn prison in San
Antonio in 1996 is an example of a security breach that "would not be tolerated" if the
prison was run by the government. Id.
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to be gained by saving on management and maintaining a full house. 28
Because of the strong public demand to stay tough on crime, governments
are likely to feel the pressure to expand prison space while at the same time
struggle with the difficulty and expense of day-to-day monitoring, thus
29
overlooking the deficiencies of private prison operators. The public
should provide the necessary oversight by classifying private operators as
agencies and their records as agency records, for purposes of the FOIA.
Communications law scholar Nicole Cdsarez argued that private
prison operators should at least be as accountable as government officials
in order to ensure that contractors "in no way abuse the public trust or
prisoners' rights."3 ° The FOIA, if applied to private contractors, would help
accomplish this oversight." While private prison operators are subject to
marketplace restrictions that increase service quality because of
competition,32 Cdsarez makes clear that it is the government that should
retain the ultimate authority over prison operations.33 The public can make
sure this monitoring is being performed, but only if the FOIA allows access
to private contractors.34
Because courts have failed to hold private entities accountable under
the FOIA,35 Cdsarez argues that the federal government can frustrate the
28. See Ratliff, supra note 22, at 373-74; see also McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417, 424
(6th Cir. 1996) ("[While privately employed correctional officers are serving the public
interest by maintaining a correctional facility, they are not principally motivated by a desire
to further the interests of the public at large."); ROBBINs, supra note 26, at 2-5; Rivard,
supra note 27.
29. See Ratliff, supra note 22, at 379-80. In fact, Ratliff argues that the financial interest
of private prison operators makes privatization potentially unconstitutional because due
process requires the disinterest of the person affecting prisoners' liberties, and private
operators cannot remove their own profit interests from the decisions that affect prisoners'
constitutional rights. See id. at 385-86. At the very least, close scrutiny of private prison
operations is essential, and enabling statutes should closely proscribe the conduct of private
operators. See id. at 393, 398-99.
30. Cdsarez, supra note 3, at 250. (describing an example of prison operator abuse
when prisoners were forced to remain outside for many hours a day in intense heat).
31. Seeid. at300.
32. See id. at 259-60. Marketplace restrictions theoretically exist because if a private
operator does not provide a level of quality that is acceptable to the government, it will lose
out on future bids for private operation. Thus, the private operator will strive to provide the
same quality as the government would provide. See id.
33. See id. at 303. This government authority could be achieved if the government is
contractually allowed to oversee private prison operations, demand information from private
prison operators, and replace private operators for insufficient performance. See id. at 27475.
34. See id. at 268-69 (discussing the application of the Act's terms "agency" and
agency "records" as being the ultimate deterrent to public access to information as the law
currently stands). See discussion infra Parts II-IV.
35. See infra Part IV.
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public disclosure purposes behind the Act by delegating services to the
private sector.16 Therefore, Congress must step in to enact legislation
holding private prison operators accountable or to amend the FOIA's
definition of "agency" to include entities performing "significant agency
functions. 37 This Article makes a similar argument by stating that agency
and agency records should include any entity or records relating to a
government function, even if that function is now being performed by the
private sector. Congress should amend the FOIA to make sure public

information does not become private simply because it is no longer in
agency hands.
Other examples of federal privatization could have a direct impact on

the public's ability to obtain important information. In January 1998, the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the federal government's largest
contracting agency, refused to allow nuclear watchdog groups access to
documents in the hands of its contractors. 38 The result of the pending
litigation in the DOE's case could have a major impact on the
government's accountability for its energy operations because the DOE
contracts with private corporations and nonprofit organizations to perform
over eighty percent of its work.3 9 Records such as travel expenses of top
officials and descriptions of new weapons projects, which are important for
public oversight of how its money is spent, could be closed off to the public
if the federal courts in New Mexico and California do not hold the
contractors accountable as agencies holding agency records under the
FOIA.4 Under the prevailing federal case law, this is not likely to happen,4 '
36. See Csarez, supra note 3, at 292-93.
37. See id. at 293, 296. Essentially, Casarez argues that the federal government cannot
be trusted to monitor private prisons effectively due to the expense and difficulty involved.
See id. at 294-95. Additionally, corruption plays a role when government overseers turn a
"blind eye" to abuses because of the potential for payoffs or private sector jobs. See id. at
295. However, Cdsarez admits that amending the FOIA would cause a severe swell in the
number of records available for requests from entities performing government functions,
and defining the parameters of what constitutes a government function would be difficult.
See id. at 296-97. Therefore, FOIA access itself is not enough to ensure adequate public
monitoring, and the enabling legislation itself should make private prison records the public
records of the contracting government agency. See id. at 303.
38. See Ian Hoffman, DOE FightsRecords' Release, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 23, 1998,
at Al.
39. See id.
40. See id. In fact, even when it does not directly refuse to release records, nuclear
watchdog groups say the DOE delays the release of records for months or years. See id. The
DOE's attorney says other federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense and NASA,
also engage in delays even though they have guidelines for the release of information. See
id. According to the DOE's lawyer, the DOE guidelines go beyond what the FOIA requires.
See id.
41. See infra Part IV.
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and the federal courts are not likely to force the DOE to comply with its
own guidelines because unlike the FOIA, the guidelines are not law.42
Additionally, the federal government considered removing
impediments to privatizing airports. In 1996, the federal government began
discussing the possibility of easing the federal restrictions on privatizing
state or municipality-run airports. 4 ' These discussions could lead to the
easier sale of airports to private companies, which could put a large amount
of important aviation information out of the public's reach. The potential
for further federal privatization highlights the need for a broader
application of the FOIA to entities performing important public functions
and controlling important public information.
Although the FOIA may not reach private entities, some
commentators argue that privatization can be an effective tool for the
government, if used properly. Communications scholars Joseph Caponio
and Janet Geffner discussed privatization as an economically beneficial
alternative for government, as long as the government promotes access to
guidelines
important information. 44 They state that this can be done throughS41
imposed on the federal government when it chooses to privatize. In fact,

42. See Hoffman, supra note 38.
43. See Martha M. Canan, House Committee Looks at Paving Way for EasierAirport
Sales, BOND BUYER, Mar. 8, 1996, at 7, available in LEXIS, News Library, ABBB File.
44. See Caponio & Geffner, supra note 6, at 148. Caponio and Geffner admit, however,
that there is agreement that some important services are "inherently governmental" and
should not be privatized. Id. They say these services have not been explicitly enumerated.
See id.
In 1986, the first national conference on privatization opportunities was held in New
York City, with a focus on how privatization can increase efficiency without decreasing
services to the public. See Privatization; National Conference to Be Held in June, Bus.
WIRE, Apr. 22, 1986. At the conference, issues relating to the benefits and difficulties of
privatizing health care, correctional facilities, transportation, waste management, energy
supply, and hazardous waste management were discussed. See id. This conference shows
that officials are interested in increasing efficiency and decreasing the cost deficit of many
government services, but the article did not discuss any possible impact on freedom of
information.
45. See Caponio & Geffner, supra note 6, at 149. For example, in 1989, the Information
Industry Association proposed before the House Subcommittee on Government Information,
Justice, and Agriculture a policy framework that would "guarantee continuing public access
to government information" in the face of technological advances and new strategies for
managing government information. IIA Proposes Policy Framework to Guarantee
Continuing Public Access to Government Information, INFO. TODAY, May 1, 1989, at 35.
The National Association of Information President also testified before the Senate
Committee on Rules and Administration in 1997, stating that Congress "should institute and
enforce policies that ensure that citizens can access government information from a wide
diversity of public and private resources." Title 44, U.S. Code-Proposalfor Revision:
Hearings on Title 44 Before the Subcomm. on Rules and Administration, 105th Cong. 74
(1997) (testimony of Ronald G. Dunn, Information Industry Association).
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Caponio and Geffner argue that private entities could provide for more
efficient distribution of information as long as they are subjected to specific
46
guidelines when contracting for government services.
Such guidelines have been successfully implemented for certain
government agencies wishing to contract out certain services in order to
save money for use in other agency operations.47 For example, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOSA), the National Technical
Information Service (NTIS), and the federal libraries successfully
participated in privatization programs for the management of scientific and
technical information of interest to the public.4 8 According to Caponio and
Geffner, these programs succeeded because of government monitoring of
services, the value added to the public information, and the efficiency of
dissemination.49 However, Caponio and Geffner do not recognize that if the
private entities refused to provide access to the information, they would not
be subject to the FOIA because they would not be considered agencies
holding agency records. 50 Thus, public information could potentially be lost
should public access come in conflict with the goals of the agencies and
their private contractors.
In short, while some commentators recognize the efficiency of
privatization, others fear a loss of important public access and oversight.
Commentators argue that without oversight, the free flow of information,
important abuses, and constitutional violations could be shielded from
46. See Caponio & Geffner, supra note 6, at 149-50. These guidelines, according to
Caponio and Geffner, should include not only adequate public access, but guard against
"monopolistic controls," such as unreasonably high prices for access to information. Id. at
150.
47. See id. at 150.
48. See iL at 150-53.
49. See id. However, Caponio and Geffner admit that information can become more
expensive if the private contractor employs more staff than previously needed by the
government to disseminate the information. See id. at 153. Thus, not all "management
problems" can be solved through privatization. Id. at 154.
50. See infra Part IV.
51. This debate also reached the legal profession in recent years as West Publishing, a
contractor with the federal government for legal information, sought to protect its "value[]added" information from disclosure under the FOTA. John J. Oslund, West Publishing,
CompetitorsSpar over Bill Provision over Information,MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR-TRm.,
Feb. 10, 1995, at Dl. West is likely to win this debate because the documents are no longer
in possession or control of the government, and, therefore, they are likely to be considered
private documents when held by West Publishing. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Tax
Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1989); discussion infra Part IV-B.
Additionally, other national governments exempt private companies dealing with the
government from the reach of freedom of information initiatives, sparking a debate over the
need to know how government money is being spent. See, e.g., Saskatchewan Gets
Information Bill, OTrAWA CrMZEN, Apr. 20, 1991, at A7.
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public knowledge.52 Some argue that the appropriate method for ensuring
that private entities follow legal prescriptions is through a concept of state
action, which effectively makes private operators responsible as if they
were the government.53 One possible consequence of this extension of the
state action doctrine is to make private entities subject to the FOIA as if
they are government agencies, as long as they are performing a public
function. 54
In determining whether or not the FOIA applies to private entities
delegated functions by the federal government, courts currently conduct
two separate inquiries. First, they must determine whether private entities
can be considered agencies as defined under the Act. 55 Second, the court
must determine if the records are agency records, a term that was not given
any meaning under the Act until the 1996 amendments." Even if the
entities are not agencies, courts could nonetheless require them to disclose
records if there is a sufficient nexus between the records and an agency to
create agency records.57 The purpose of Part III is to discuss the explicit
language of the FOIA and the stated purposes behind it as discussed by
Congress. Part IV then analyzes federal court application of the FOIA to
private entities dealing with the government and with information of
interest to the public. Lastly, Part V analyzes the various court approaches
and suggests an approach to defining "agency" and "agency records" that
would better comport with the spirit of the FOIA.

52. See Cdsarez, supra note 3, at 260; see generally Ronald A. Cass, Privatization:
Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REv. 449, 496-523 (1988) (discussing the legal
difficulties that result from privatization, such as the application of constitutional guarantees
to private entities and the application of governmental immunity to private entities).
53. See Cdsarez, supra note 3, at 303; Cass, supra note 52, at 505; Daphne Barak-Erez,
A State Action Doctrinefor an Age of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169 (1995)
(discussing the need to extend the current state action doctrine to government delegation to
private entities in order to ensure constitutional guarantees, particularly through requiring
private entities performing public services that are not also provided by the state to abide by
constitutional limitations); Mays, supra note 17, at 68-69; Bunker & Davis, supra note 3, at
18.
54. See Bunker & Davis, supra note 3, at 18-24. This adaptation of the state action
doctrine would make private entities comply with the FOIA because, if they are performing
a "public function," they are considered state actors for other purposes. Id. In essence, this
approach eliminates the possibility that an entity will be considered a state actor for all
purposes except the FOIA. See discussion infra Part V.
55. See Cdsarez, supra note 3, at 267-68.
56. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2) (Supp. II 1996)
(defining the term "record" but not defining "agency record").
57. See id.
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IH. PRIVATIZATION AND THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
Commentators point out that due to the rise in government delegation
to administrative agencies, Congress passed the FOIA in 1966 as an
attempt to better allow citizens to find out about government action. 8
Because it was suggested that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was
actually being used to withhold information from the public,59 Congress
amended the APA with the FOIA in order to foster a government founded
on a policy of disclosure. 60 As commentators and the FOIA's legislative
history make clear, the FOIA's purposes are to allow the public to be
informed about public policy and to protect the public from a secret
government, which breeds mistrust and corruption.6' Communications law
narrowed these goals down to one word:
scholar Nicole
•• 62 Cdsarez
accountability. However, an entity will only be accountable for access if it
can be subjected to the specific terms of the FOIA.

A.

The Definition of "Agency" Under the Act

The FOIA and its legislative history provide some guidance in
determining whether private entities doing business with the government
will be subject to access. Under 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1), the definition of
"agency" is expanded beyond the entities provided for in the APA. 63
58. See Cdsarez, supra note 3, at 264-65;

HAROLD

L.

CROSS,

KNow: LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS AND PROCEDURES

THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO

231-34 (1953) (discussing the

rise in administrative regulations during this century); JUSTIN D. FRANKLN & ROBERT F.
BOUCHARD, GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY Acrs § 1.02
(1997).
The U.S. Supreme Court discussed the public's ability to find out what its government
is up to as the central purpose behind the FOIA. See United States Dep't of Justice v.
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989). Justice Douglas
mentioned this central purpose concept when he quoted an author in the New York Review of
Books for the proposition that "a democracy cannot function unless the people are permitted
to know what their government is up to." EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (quoting from Henry Steele Commager, New York Review of Books, Oct. 5,
1972, at 7).
59. See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 1 (1966); CROSS, supra note 58, at 227-28;
FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 58, at 14; Cdsarez, supra note 3, at 265.
60. See Cdsarez, supra note 3, at 265.
61. See 112 CONG. REC. H13,660 (1966) (statement of Rep. Matsunaga); C~sarez,
supra note 3, at 265-66; see generally Kenneth C. Davis, The Information Act: A
PreliminaryAnalysis, 34 U. CI-. L. REv. 761 (1966-67).
62. See CMsarez, supra note 3, at 266.
63. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1994) (defining "agency" as "any authority of the
Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another
agency"). The APA makes "any administrative unit with substantial independent authority
in the exercise of specific functions" an agency. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1073 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
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Section 552(f)(1) provides:
For purposes of this section, the term "agency" as defined in section
551(1) of this title includes any executive department, military
department, [g]ovemment corporation, [g]overnment[-]controlled
corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the
[g]ovemment (including the Executive Office of the President), or any
independent regulatory agency.64

When Congress amended FOIA in 1974, it added section 552(f)(1)
and broadened the definition of "agency" to include entities not explicitly
mentioned under the APA, but which "perform governmental functions and
control information of interest to the public."6 For example, the term

"government-controlled corporation" was meant to reach corporations that

receive federal funds and operate under federal control, such as the Postal
66
Service and Amtrak. However, the FOIA's legislative history clearly

states that merely receiving federal funding will not create a governmentcontrolled corporation under the FOIA; the entity must be chartered or
controlled by the government. 67
Once an entity falls under the FOIA's definition of "agency," the
entity must comply with the FOIA when it adopts a rule or guideline, or
when it receives an access request. 68 Some suggest that the drafters of the
1974 amendments intended to create a broad definition of "agency" that
would include federal organizations and entities, specifically excluding
certain entities such as Congress and the courts. 69 However, the actual
64. 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1) (Supp. 111996).
65. H.R. REP. No. 93-876, at 8 (1974).
66. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, at 14-15 (1974); see generally Aug v. National R.R.
Passenger Corp., 425 F. Supp. 946 (D.D.C. 1976) (finding Amtrak subject to disclosure
requirements); National W. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 454, 459 (N.D. Tex.
1980) (holding the Postal Service is a public agency even though it operates like a private
business).
67. See National W. Life Ins. Co., 512 F. Supp. at 454; Meyer & Adler, supra note 13,
at 191. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals provided a detailed discussion of the legislative
history behind the Act's definition of "agency." See Irwin Mem'l Blood Bank v. American
Nat'l Red Cross, 640 F.2d 1051, 1052-54 (9th Cir. 1981); Cdsarez, supra note 3, at 268-73.
Congress itself can also choose to define what entities are subject to disclosure
requirements through the enactment of other laws, such as the Rail Passenger Service Act,
which made Amtrak subject to the provisions of the FOIA. See Aug, 425 F. Supp. at 950.
68. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. II 1996); JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL
INFORMATION DIsCLOSURE § 4.02, at 4.3 (2d ed. 1999).
69. See O'REILLY, supra note 68; Taylor v. Diznoff, 633 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
One commentator stated that a private entity can only be considered an agency if it has
statutory authority to make decisions for the contracting agency. See Anne H. Wright, The
Definition of "Agency" Under the Freedom of Information Act as Applied to Federal
Consultants and Grantees, 69 GEO. L.J. 1223, 1240 (1981). Wright refers to the stance
taken by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Washington Research
Project v. Department of Health, 504 F.2d 238, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See discussion infra
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application of the "agency" definition has proved difficult for the courts,
considering "the myriad [of] organizational arrangements for getting the
business of the government done. ' 70 Because the FOIA must establish the
right of access and no right exists unless an agency is involved, the
construction of
• this definition •by the
71 courts is crucial to the public's ability
to monitor government operations.
B.

"Agency Records" Underthe Act

In order to obtain information under the FOIA, the information must
be considered an agency record. 72 But unlike the Act's definition of
"agency," the term "record" was not defined under the Act until the 1996
amendments.7 ' After the 1996 amendments, section 552(f)(2) defines
"record and any other term used in this section in reference to information"
as including "any information that would be an agency record subject to the
requirements of this section when maintained by an agency in any format,
including an electronic format." 74 However, federal courts agree that in
addition to the agency and record requirements, the record must be
sufficiently linked to agency operations in order to label the information an
Part IV.A. This Author's research has not revealed other commentators taking this stance
with regard to the law in other federal circuits.
70. Washington Research Project v. Department of Health, 504 F.2d 238, 246 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
71. See O'REILLY, supra note 68, § 4.02. In his treatise on freedom of information,
O'Reilly gives a thorough description of the various entities considered to be agencies under
the FOIA, as interpreted by the federal courts. See id.; see generally Richard P. Shafer,
Annotation, Meaning of Term "Agency" For Purposes of Freedom of Information Act, 57
A.L.R. FED. 295 (1982) (providing a detailed overview of the various cases applying the
agency definition to various entities). For a discussion of the federal court cases discussing
the meaning of this term, see infra Part IV.
72. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. II 1996) (referring to the disclosure of "records"); 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. II 1996) (referring to "agency records" for enforcement);
Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 178 (1980) ("The use of the word 'agency' as a modifier
demonstrates that Congress contemplated some relationship between an 'agency' and the
'record' requested under the FOIA."); Katherine A. Meyer et al.,
Agency Records, in
LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS

194-200 (Allan R. Adler ed.,

1997).
73. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2). There was originally no legislative history construing the
term "agency record." See Nichols v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 130, 134 (D. Kan. 1971),
affd, 460 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1972). The 1996 amendments, commonly known as the
Electronic Freedom of Information Act (EFOIA), added the definition of "record" and were
meant to provide for public access to information in an electronic format. See Electronic
Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048.
74. 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2). This arguably vague definition suggests that a record should
include something held in any format, but does not hint at the link between the record and
an agency that is required to create an agency record. This Author has not discovered recent
cases construing this new definition of "record" to mean anything different than the
previous cases discussed in this Article.
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agency record.75 The 1996 amendments do not provide any insight as to
what the term "agency record" means, as they only expand the definition of
"record" to include information stored in an electronic format.
The question is what relationship between the agency and the record
must exist to create an agency record under the FOIA. One commentator
argued that defining "agency record" too narrowly effectively expands the
FOIA's nine exemptions and obstructs the Act's goals of obtaining "the
fullest responsible disclosure," which enable citizens to have a hand in their
own government. 76 If the government holds the information itself or makes
a decision based on information contained in records created by a
nonagency, it can
be77 argued that these should be agency records and
S
subject to disclosure. Regardless of whether the agency possesses the
75. See Marie Veronica O'Connell, Note, A Control Test for Determining "Agency
Record" Status Under the Freedom of Information Act, 85 CoLuM. L. REv. 611, 614
(1985); see also FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 58, at 32-39; Stephen D. Hall, What Is
a Record? Two Approaches to the Freedom of Information Act's Threshold Requirement,
1978 BYU L. REV. 408, 427 (1978) (arguing that to achieve flexibility on the record
question, courts should use their equitable powers instead of being tied to rigorous
definitions).
Since the passage of the EFOIA, some argue that Congress intended the 1996
amendments to ensure that the FOIA's definition of "record" would be interpreted broadly.
For example, Senator Patrick Leahy, who commented on the amendments in the Senate
before EFOIA's passage, stated that "the legislative finding for the [E]FOIA [a]mendments
clarifies that the purpose of the FOIA is to allow any person to access government
information for any purpose." Patrick Leahy, The Electronic FOIA Amendments of 1996:
Reformatting the FOIA for On-Line [sic] Access, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 339, 340 (1998). In
fact, Senator Leahy stated that the amendments were meant to ensure that agency records
mean more than just records that directly shed light on the operations of the government
agency. See id.; see also Michael E. Tankersley, How the Electronic Freedom of
Information Act Amendments of 1996 Update Public Access for the Information Age, 50
ADMIN. L. REv. 421, 457 (1998) ("For the first time, all federal agencies are required to
make broad categories of agency records immediately available to the public at agency
records depositories and on-line [sic].").
However, the argument that EFOIA actually broadens any definition of "agency
record" has not been adopted by the federal courts, and it has also been argued that if
Congress wanted to broaden access, it would have been more explicit in the amendments.
See, e.g., Martin E. Halstuk, Bits, Bytes, and the Right to Know: How the Electronic
Freedom of Information Act Holds the Key to Public Access to a Wealth of Usefid
Government Databases,15 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 73 (1998) (arguing that
Congress should be more specific by amending the FOIA further to ensure that its purpose
of broad disclosure is fulfilled). EFOIA simply states that records maintained in an
electronic format are to be treated the same as those records held in paper format, and it did
not explicitly change the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in United States Department of
Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) that the
FOIA is meant to allow access to information dealing directly with government agency
performance. See id. Thus, the EFOIA amendments do not change the case law that
determines what is an agency record under the FOIA.
76. Wion, supra note 14, at 1095.
77. See id. at 1097.
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record or relies on it in the decision-making process, disclosure would
nonetheless be in keeping with the FOIA's purpose of allowing oversight
of the entities that "control information of interest to the public" because, in
either case, the record relates to a public function. 78 This Article argues that
as long as the record relates to a public, government function, it should be
accessible under the FOIA without a narrow focus on who possesses or
controls the record. In other words, the information is public and should
therefore be open to the public.
Some note, however, that research held by independent companies,
which forms the basis of government reports and is used for government
decisions, nonetheless falls outside of the Act under the federal courts'
interpretation of agency records.79 While government possession of
information will usually create an agency record,"° absent possession or
significant day-to-day control by the government agency, a mere use or
reliance on nonagency-created information will not turn it into an agency
record.8'
In short, the requirement that the subject of a FOIA request be an
agency record is a threshold requirement under the Act, and information
possessed by researchers and other private entities will not generally be
82
considered agency records. Commentators both fear that a narrow
definition of "agency record" will create a new exemption to the FOIA and
that an overly broad meaning of the term will discourage private
contractors and grantees by subjecting their confidential information to
public scrutiny. 3 Because Congress has thus far left the issue undecided, it
becomes an issue for the courts to decide whether to read the words
"agency record" literally and let Congress decide on their true meaning or
to form a judicial definition of "agency record." 84 This can allow
78. H.R. RP. No. 93-876, at 9 (1974); see also Wion, supra note 14, at 1097.
79. See Wion, supra note 14, at 1102-06. For a summary of many of these cases, see
discussion infra Part IV.
80. See Wion, supra note 14, at 1107; Forsham v. Califano, 587 F.2d 1128, 1134 n.11
(D.C. Cir. 1978). Possession will generally suffice to create agency records unless the
records are created by a group specifically excluded from the Act by Congress. See, e.g.,
Warth v. Department of Justice, 595 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1979). In these cases, courts have
generally required control of the record by the covered agency. See, e.g., Goland v. CIA, 3
Media L. Rep. 2341 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Thus, possession is a necessary requirement for
agency record status, but it is not sufficient in all cases. For a discussion of this official
control requirement, see infra Part IV.B.
81. See Forsham, 587 F.2d at 1133; Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Mathews, 428 F. Supp. 523,
529 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). For a discussion of these cases, see infra Part 1V.B.
82. See Note, "Agency Records" Under the Freedom of Information Act. An Analysis
ofForsham v. Califano, 13 GA. L. REv. 1040, 1042-43 (1979).
83. See id. at 1054-55 (discussing the fears of both access and privatization advocates).
84. See id. at 1056-57. The note describes these two approaches taken by the majority
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government agencies to challenge FOIA requests for information
originating in or transferred to entities not technically covered under the
Act.85
Congress intended the FOIA's terms to be read liberally in favor of
disclosure "unless information is exempted under clearly delineated
,,16
statutory language.
But commentators continually argue that judicial
interpretations of the agency and agency records requirements have
effectively narrowed the Act's application, allowing government agencies
to avoid the Act's requirements by transferring records out of the
87
government's hands. The next section of this Article analyzes the various
federal court opinions, giving meaning to the "agency" and "agency
records" definitions under the Act. Part IV classifies the decisions based on
their approaches to applying the Act to private entities. Part V then
discusses how these approaches affect the ability of government agencies
to avoid the requirements of access through privatization, and how a more
liberal definition of "agency" and "agency record" would better square
with the spirit of the FOIA.
IV. PRIVATIZATION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN
FEDERAL COURTS
In determining whether to subject private entities to the FOIA, federal

and dissent, in Forsham v. Califano, as the property and government involvement
approaches, respectively. See id. The property approach relies on specific and literal
meanings of "agency records," while the government involvement approach is fashioned by
the judiciary to take a more flexible account of the government's involvement with the
records-making it more likely that private entities will be subject to the Act. See id. at
1066-67.
85. See O'Connell, supra note 75, at 612. In this note, O'Connell concludes that agency
record should be defined broadly by looking at the function of the record, thus determining
if it is used by the government for its functions. See id. Otherwise, the purposes of
disclosure behind the FOIA will be undermined. See id. at 615-16.
Neither Congress nor the courts have determined what is sufficient control to make
private documents agency records. See id. at 624. O'Connell argues that "[b]y letting the
public eye follow where agency hands reach, a control standard promotes a more informed
electorate and a more accountable government." Id. at 626. In short, if the government
produces part of the material or relies on it in its decision, that material is part of the
decision-making process and should be subject to the FOIA, to hold otherwise would
actually allow agencies to avoid disclosure by transfer to nonagencies. See id. at 626-27.
86. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965); see also 112 CON&. REc. H13,654 (1966)
(statement of Rep. Rumsfeld, a member of the House Subcommittee that drafted the FOIA);
O'Connell, supra note 75, at 620.
87. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 75, at 617-20, 626-27; Wion, supra note 14, at
1093. O'Connell argues that this can be avoided by fashioning a "control test" that focuses
on the agency's superior ability to control and use the records. O'Connell, supra note 75, at
629-30.
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courts have taken a variety of approaches. While they have had some
direction from Congress in determining what is an agency under the Act,"
they must also determine if the record in question is an agency record, a
finding they must make without direction from Congress. 9 The purpose of
Part A of this section is to analyze two federal court factors used in
determining what is an agency under the Act. Part B then analyzes the
factors used by the federal courts in attempting to define the term "agency
record."
A.

DeterminingWhat Is an "Agency" Under the FOIA

In construing the FOIA's definition of "agency," 9° federal courts have
considered two factors. One factor asks whether the entity has substantial
independent authority in performing a function of the government, making
it the functional equivalent of the government. 9' The other factor asks
whether the government substantially controls the entity's day-to-day
operations or organizational framework. 92 In using either factor, the court is
essentially asking to what degree the entity is performing a government
function. In one case, the government is pulling nearly all of the strings; in
the other case, the entity is making decisions independently for the
government. Although these two factors can overlap, they will be treated
separately in this Part in order to distinguish the reasoning behind each
factor.
1.

The Control Factor

The seminal case in determining what constitutes an agency under the
FOIA is the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Forsham v. Harris.93 In that
case, the petitioners sought the release of raw data possessed by a group of
private physicians and scientists conducting research under federal grants
from the National Institute of Arthritis, Metabolism, and Digestive
Diseases (NIAMDD). 94 Although the NIAMDD supervised the grantees
and had a right of access and permanent custody of their documents, it did
not exercise these rights and left the day-to-day operations of the program
to the grantees.95 The raw data ultimately led to the restriction of certain
88. See supra Part I.A.
89. See supra Part III.B.
90. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(0 (Supp. II 1996); see also discussion supra Part III.A.
91. See e.g., United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814 (1976).
92. See e.g., Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 (1980). For a discussion of the factors
determining what constitutes an agency under the Act, see Shafer, supra note 71, § 4.02.
93. 445 U.S. 169 (1980).
94. See id. at 172.
95. See id. at 173.
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drugs by the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) and the
96
(FDA).
Administration
Drug
and
Food
Although the Court admitted that a federal grantee could potentially
be considered a federal agency, that status could only be conferred on
entities subjected to substantial federal supervision, not merely federal
"regulatory authority necessary to assure compliance with the goals of the
federal grant." 97 Private grantees, which are neither chartered by the
government nor controlled by it, cannot be considered agencies under the
Act.98 Because the grantees in Forsham retained their decision-making
authority, there was no extensive, day-to-day supervision by the
government necessary to turn the grantees into a federal agency. 99 Without
this substantial control by the government, the Court reasoned that
Congress did not intend federal funding and supervision alone to create an
agency under the Act.'°°
The Court based its decision in Forsham on an earlier decision
involving a private corporation, United States v. Orleans.'° In that case, a
federally funded community action agency was sued under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. 10 Although the agency was completely funded by the
government, it was independently operated and not subject to the control of
the government.' 3 The government did not have the power to supervise the
day-to-day operations of the community action agency, but was instead free
to contract with the agency in order to protect its investment. 104 This did not
turn acts of the agency into acts of the government for purposes of the Tort
Claims Act,'0 5 and this reasoning was carried over to the FOIA definition of
"agency" in Forsham.
Lower federal courts have followed the Forsham-Orleansapproach
96. See id. at 174-75.
97. Id. at 180 n.11.
98. See id. at 179 (citing H. CoNF. REP. No. 93-180, at 14-15 (1974)).
99. See id. at 180. The Supreme Court essentially followed the reasoning of the U. S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which held that entities receiving
federal grants do not on that factor alone become government agencies. See Forsham v.
Califano, 587 F.2d 1128, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1978), af'd, Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169
(9180). Even with the multimillion dollar federal grant, which entirely funded the study, the
government had not exercised its contractual right to review or retain the raw data. See id. at
1136. Without the exercise of its "audit rights," the government essentially exercised no
control over the project. Id.
100. See Forsham, 445 U.S. at 181. Additionally, the Court would not allow access
though a broadening of the agency records definition. See id.; discussion infra Part IV.B.
101. 425 U.S. 807 (1976).
102. See id.
103. See id. at 814.
104. See id. at 815.
105. See id. at 815-16.
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by requiring government control of a private entity before holding the
entity accountable under the FOIA. In Rocap v. Indiek,'06 the court of
appeals found that the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(FHLMC) was an agency under the FOIA because it met the definition of
"government-controlled corporation" under section 552(f) of the Act. 0'7
This was due to several factors: the FHLMC was chartered under federal
law; it was controlled by federal statute; its employees were federal
employees; it operated solely on federal funds; and it was subject to the
complete control of federal officials.13 In essence, it was "subject to such
substantial federal control over its day-to-day operations" that it was
clearly an agency under the Act.3 9 While one of these factors alone would
not be enough to make the FHLMC an agency under the Act, the court held
that when combined, the factors meant that the FHLMC was the kind of
entity Congress intended to include in the "government-controlled
corporation" definition." 0
Four years after Rocap, the D.C. Circuit held in Public Citizen Health
Research Group v. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. that a
medical foundation contracting with the HEW to conduct a professional
standards review for the Medicare and Medicaid programs was not an
agency under the FOIA.12 The foundation was a private, nonprofit
corporation organized pursuant to state law, and its operations were the
responsibility of private physicians, not the government." 3 Because the
foundation was independently run by private physicians, with little review
by the government, the court concluded that Congress did not intend for
these review entities to be subject to public access. Although the private
foundation was making decisions with direct implications for the federal
Medicare and Medicaid programs, it had to remain
closed to public
5
scrutiny because it was independent of government"
106. 539 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
107. See id. at 175; 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (Supp. II 1996).
108. See Rocap, 539 F.2d at 176.

109. Id. at 177.
110. See id. The court noted, however, that Congress did not intend to extend the agency
definition to "corporations which receive appropriated funds but are neither chartered by the
[flederal [g]ovemment nor controlled by it." Id.at 174 n.4 (citing S. CoNF. REP. 93-1200, at

14-15 (1974)).
111. 668 F.2d 537 (D.C.Cir. 1981).
112. See id. at 538.
113. See id. at 542.
114. See id. at 543. The court noted that just because an organization makes decisions
that impact the government does not make it a government agency because "each new
arrangement must be examined anew and in its own context." Id. at 542.
115. See id. at 543-44. The court described the foundation's function as though the
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Writing in concurrence, Chief Judge Edward Tamm pointed out that
each case determining whether an entity is an agency under the Act must be
examined in its own context." 6 He wrote to express his belief that the
factors used to determine agency status are not necessarily cumulative. It
would not be necessary, for example, to show that an entity has authority to
make decisions for the government and that it is controlled by the
government." 7 A "galaxy of factors," such as control, the nature of the
entity, what portion of its business is conducted through government
contract, and the nature of the function performed should be considered to
ensure that the values of the FOIA are protected, rather than applying a
rigid, cumulative approach." 8
physicians were acting as expert advisors to the government. See id. The court reasoned that
it would be impractical and unfair to subject groups such as this to public scrutiny just
because they render opinions for the government. See id. Statutory provisions and
regulations which govern the private group, standing alone, did not provide the degree of
government control necessary to turn the foundation into an agency under the FOIA. See id.
at 544; St. Mary Hosp. v. Philadelphia Prof'l Standards Review Org., No. 78-2943, 1980
WL 19448 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 1980) (holding that a Professional Standards Review
Organization (PRSO) was not an agency under the FOIA because Congress intended PRSOs
to be private and did not want the federal government to assume any day-to-day
responsibilities for running the organizations).
116. See Public Citizen Health Research Group, 668 F.2d at 544 (Tamm, J., concurring).
117. See id. The authority to make decisions for the government is discussed infra Part
IV.A.2. The district court previously held that the medical foundation was an agency under
the FOIA because it had independent authority to make decisions; it was required to review
health care and to make final, binding determinations as to whether the care rendered was
necessary; and thus qualified for federal reimbursement under the Medicare and Medicaid
programs. See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Department of Health, Educ. and
Welfare, 449 F. Supp. 937 (D.D.C. 1978). The lower court found that because the
foundation had the authority to make crucial decisions, the foundation qualified as an
agency. The federal circuit court relied, however, on a control test, finding that the lack of
federal day-to-day control made the foundation a private entity not subject to FOIA. See
Public Citizen Health Research Group, 668 F.2d at 537.
118. Id. at 545. In dissent, Judge Mikva also expressed the concern that the majority was
applying a rigid, cumulative test to determine when an entity is an agency under the Act. See
id. (Mikva, J., dissenting). Judge Mikva did not want "independence from the government'
to be dispositive because other factors could necessitate finding that the values of the FOIA
would be served by disclosure. Id. He wanted some discussion about which factors should
be given more weight and which factors could necessitate a result in certain situations. See
id.
In seeking a more generalized explanation of the process to be employed, Judge Mikva
explained the difference between independent decision making and government control by
stating that "[blodies with the delegated authority to make significant decisions are agencies
in their own right. They act in the place of a preexisting government body in the exercise of
a central function." Id. at 546. In contrast:
Bodies that are very closely controlled by the government are also subject to
FOIA, but for the opposite reason. They possess too little independent authority to
be considered entities separate from the government agency to which they are
related. Their records are equivalent to the records of the controlling agency.
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Similar to the majority in the second Public Citizen Health Research
Group case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used a control test in Irwin
Memorial Blood Bank of the San FranciscoMedical Society v. American
National Red Cross"9 to determine that the American Red Cross is not an
agency under the FOIA120 Even though the Red Cross has a close
relationship with the federal government, it is not subject to the kind of
"substantial federal control" by the government that would make it an
agency under the Act.' 2 1 The court admitted that each case must be decided
on its own facts because entities could differ so drastically that one case
provides little precedential value in determining when an entity should be
considered an agency.' 22 But, as a threshold showing, the court reasoned
that "substantial federal control or supervision" is required before an entity
can be considered part of the federal government.'2
By using the substantial federal control criteria, the Irwin court stated
that it intended to separate entities truly controlled by the federal
government from those that are merely "quasi-public or quasigovernmental."'' 24 To determine the proper degree of federal control, the
court stated it would be necessary to analyze the various "federal
characteristics" possessed by the entity.'25 The court stated that the Red
Cross does not employ federal employees; it does not function through
federal funding unless under specific purpose grants; and while it is
supervised to some extent by the government, the Red Cross is not directed
126
by
federalthat
officials
its day-to-day
operations.
Essentially,
court
reasoned
the RedinCross
exists to provide
voluntary
aid, and it the
exists
on

Id. at 546. In order to prevent government from farming out functions to private entities to
avoid disclosure, Judge Mikva sought a "consistent, predictable body of law" in the agency
area. Id. Because the foundation in the present case had sufficient independent decisionmaking authority, Judge Mikva would have allowed public access. See id. at 547.
119. 640 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1981).
120. See id. at 1053.
121. Id. at 1054-55.
122. See id. at 1054.
123. Id. at 1054-55.
124. Id. at 1055.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 1056-57. The government supervised the Red Cross's filing of reports and
use of federal buildings, and even though the President appoints members to the Red
Cross's Board of Governors that was not the kind of control or direction that would make
the Red Cross a government agency. See id.; Lombardo v. Handier, 397 F. Supp. 792, 802
(D.D.C. 1975) (holding that the National Academy of Sciences is not an agency under the
FOIA because it is not subject to significant day-to-day control by the government, even
with the existence of the following federal factors: it was established by and reports to
Congress; it is obligated to function for the federal government upon request; and it is
funded almost completely by the government).
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an international forum without any substantial control by one particular
government.' 7 It is a "close ally" of the U.S. government,
but it is not
12
under the direct control of the government on a daily basis. 1
2.

The Functional Equivalence Factor

This factor basically represents the opposite situation from the control
factor. Here, the entity is functioning independently, but making decisions
for the government, as opposed to having its decisions made by the
government. In effect, it is the functional equivalent of the federal
government, and, therefore, it should be an "agency" under the FOIA.
The earliest case to use this functional equivalence analysis was
Soucie v. David,12 decided before the 1974 FOIA amendments expanded
the definition of "agency." In Soucie, the court held that the Office of
Science and Technology (OST) had an independent governmental function
of evaluating federal scientific programs, making it an agency under the
APA and the FOIA. 3 ° The OST functioned as a distinct government
agency, and not merely as an arm of the President, because13 it fully
transferred responsibilities from the National Science Foundation. '
Three years after Soucie, the D.C. Circuit again discussed the
functional equivalence factor in Washington Research Project, Inc. v.

127. See Irwin, 640 F.2d at 1057-58.
128. Id.; Dong v. Smithsonian Inst., 125 F.3d 877 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that the
Smithsonian Institute is not an agency subject to the Privacy Act, which borrows its
definition of "agency" from the FOIA, because the Smithsonian is not subject to the day-today control of the government).
In contrast to Dong, the D.C. District Court previously held that the Smithsonian
Institute was an agency subject to the FOIA. See Cotton v. Adams, 798 F. Supp. 22, 24
(D.D.C. 1992). The court reasoned that the Smithsonian performs government functions as a
center of scholarship and national treasures because it is chartered by Congress, receives
federal funding, enjoys immunity, and employs mainly civil service employees. See id.;
Cotton v. Heyman, 63 F.3d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (affirming the district court opinion,
while holding that the Smithsonian could reasonably believe that it was not an agency
subject to the Act; therefore, the plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney's fees).
The Dong case does not cite the earlier opinion, perhaps because the latter case deals
with the Privacy Act as opposed to the FOIA. The two cases still appear to be in conflict.
See Alexander v. FBI, 971 F. Supp. 603, 606 (D.D.C. 1997) (reasoning that Congress
essentially adopted the agency definition from the FOIA for use in the Privacy Act, but that
the Privacy Act also has explicit language which may make the agency definition somewhat
different; for example, the Privacy Act includes the Office of the President, while the FOIA
does not).
129. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
130. See id. at 1075.
131. See id. Therefore, because the OST was considered to be an agency, a report that it
generated was an agency record subject to disclosure because it was created as part of
OST's functions, unless one of the Act's exemptions applied. See id. at 1075-76.
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Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 132 In that case, the court
held that initial review groups that pass on research applications to the
National Institute of Mental Health are not agencies under the FOIA
because they do not have legal authority to make decisions. Instead, the
court considered the groups "advisory committees" 34performing staff
functions and not independent agencies under the FOIA
The court reasoned that "[e]mploying consultants to improve the
quality of the work that is done cannot elevate the consultants to the status
of the agency for which they work unless they become the functional
equivalent of the agency, making its decisions for it.' 35 In the court's view,
influence over the federal government is not enough; instead, there must be
independent authority to make decisions.136 Because the groups were not
agencies, their recommendations could only be subject to disclosure when
they were37expressly adopted by a government agency in making its
decisions.
An analysis of the case law determining when a private entity is an
agency under the FOIA reveals that a high degree of government
involvement is necessary. Unless the government substantially controls the
operations of a private entity, or unless the private entity is substantially
acting for the government, the private entity will not be subject to the Act.
The entity must, essentially, be an arm of the government.
In short, if the government desires, it could farm out operations to
private entities and avoid disclosure, as long as it stays out of the day-today operations of the private entity, yet retains its own important decisionmaking authority. The private entity would not be an agency, and its
records are not likely to be considered agency records, unless they become
government records. The agency record requirement is the subject of the
next Part.
B.

Determining What Is an "Agency Record" Underthe FOA

In addition to the requirement that the entity petitioned under the
FOIA be an agency, there must be a sufficient link between the government
agency and the record to justify calling it an agency record.'38 Although the
FOIA does not define "agency record," the U.S. Supreme Court has
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
See id. at 246.
Id.
Id. at 247-48.
See id. at 248.
See id.
See O'Connell, supra note 75, at 614.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52

determined that there must be "some relationship between an 'agency' [and
a] 'record' requested."1 39 However, courts have had difficulty in
determining the degree of this relationship, leading some to fear that the
"agency record" definition will be construed too narrowly, thereby
frustrating the purposes behind the FOIA. 140 Questions arise as to what
degree of control by the federal government over the record is necessary
before it can be considered an agency record.141 The purpose of this Part is
to analyze the various federal cases that attempted to determine what
constitutes an agency record. As this Part demonstrates, the U.S. Supreme
Court requires that the record be both possessed and controlled by an
agency under the FOIA, a test that can be termed "official control." This
test has also been followed by lower federal courts.
1.

The Supreme Court Official Control Approach

In determining what requested materials constitute agency records,
the U.S. Supreme Court uses a two-prong test. First, the Court mandates
that the government agency must "either create or obtain" the materials as a
threshold requirement for agency record status.142 In other words, it must
first determine whether the record was originally created by a government
agency, or, if it was created by a private entity, it must be obtained by the
federal agency in order to meet this threshold requirement.
Second, the Court requires direct control by the government agency
over the records at the time the FOIA request is made before they can be
considered agency records.143 Possession is a necessary requirement for
control, but it is not sufficient unless there is some sort of possession of the

139. Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 178 (1980).
140. See O'Connell, supra note 75, at 615; "Agency Records" Under the Freedom of
Information Act, supra note 82, at 1066 (arguing that a narrow definition of "agency record"
could have the effect of expanding the exemptions under the Act).
141. See O'Connell, supra note 75, at 617-19; United States v. Charmer Indus., Inc., 711
F.2d 1164 (2d Cir. 1983) (requiring documents to originate in a government body subject to
the FOIA); Carson v. United States Dep't of Justice, 631 F.2d 1008, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(holding that records central to the function of an agency are controlled by the agency);
Berry v. Department of Justice, 733 F.2d 1343, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1984) (requiring some
type of "meaningful control" by an agency over the record before it can be considered an
agency record).
142. United States Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 144 (1989). The Court
noted that creation is not an essential prerequisite to information becoming agency records;
it is enough that the agency acquire the information because "[t]o restrict the term 'agency
records' to materials generated internally would frustrate Congress'[s] desire to put within
public reach the information available to an agency in its decision-making processes." Id.
(citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 290 n.10 (1979)).
143. See Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. at 145; United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772 (1989).
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record for use in the agency's official duties. 44 The record cannot simply
be located at the agency; it must become a part of the agency's official
business.
In short, this two-prong test focuses first on creation or possession by
a federal agency in order to establish that the record has a governmental
purpose and is not purely private. It then moves to whether the necessary
control is present through both possession and use in the agency's official
duties at the time the FOIA request is made. By focusing on both an official
purpose of the record 45 and control over the record at the time of the FOIA
request, this two-prong test can be termed an "official control" test.
Discussing the creation or possession prong of the test, the Court in
Forsham held that data created by a group of private physicians could not
be considered agency records because the data was not at any time obtained
by the Secretary of HEW. 146 In order for records that are created, owned,
and possessed by a private entity to become agency records, they must first
be obtained by a FOIA agency.' 47 Because the FOIA agency in Forsham
only had rights of access and permanent custody of the records, and did not
in fact possess the records, the data did not have the necessary link to be
considered agency records. The first prong of the agency records test was
not satisfied-there was no creation or possession by a FOIA agency.149
The Court reasoned that federal funding and supervision alone did not
make the private group an agency under the FOIA, and therefore its records
could not be considered agency records as long as they remained in private
hands.150 The Forsham Court, therefore, created a threshold requirement of
creation or possession, and in that case, it was not necessary to inquire
further into the nature of the records because the FOIA agency had never
possessed the records. 5'

144. See Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. at 145.
145. This would be established by showing either that the government created the record
itself, or that a private entity created the record and it was later obtained by the agency,
suggesting that the record was used by an agency for an official governmental purpose.
146. See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 171 (1980).
147. See id.
148. See id. at 173. The Court pointed out that even the Code of Federal Regulations
states that until the records are obtained by the federal agency, they are only "records of
grantees." Id. at 181 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 74.24 (1979)). Under the FOIA itself, the records
must have been in fact obtained, not merely could have been obtained, before they can be
considered agency records. See id. at 186.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 181.

151. See id. at 182. The Court also noted that "Congress has associated creation or
acquisition with the concept of a governmental record" in other statutory contexts, such as
the Records Disposal Act and in the legislative history of the FOIA itself. Id. at 183-85.
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In dissent, Justice William Brennan preferred to weigh each case on
its merits, noting that where the nexus between the agency and the
information is close and where the information is important to the public's
understanding of agency operations, the information should be an agency
record under the FOIA. 15 2 For Justice Brennan, the issue was "the
importance of the record to an understanding of [g]overnment activities"
and the extent to which the agency has treated the record as part of the
regulatory process, not actual possession. 53 Because the government
agencies at issue in Forsham significantly relied on the private study, and
were "deeply involved" in the creation of the data, Justice Brennan
would
54
have held the information to be an agency record under the Act.
The second prong of the official control test-the requirement that the
records be in the possession of a FOIA agency at the time of the request for
use in its official duties-was solidified in 1980 in Kissinger v. Reporters

The Court agreed with the lower court's reasoning that a federal agency should not be
required to exercise its right of access in order to create an agency record because the FOIA
does not require agencies to create records. See Forshain v. Califano, 587 F.2d 1128, 113637 (D.C. Cir. 1978), aff'd, Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 (1980). Only if a federal agency
has created or obtained a record, or if it has some duty to obtain it in the course of doing its
work, can the record be considered an agency record. See id. at 1136. The majority,
however, acknowledged that "[o]bviously a government agency cannot circumvent FOIA by
transferring physical possession of its records to a warehouse or like bailee." Id. at 1136
n.19. Additionally, the court stated: "Scientists engaged in research on federal grants must
accept the fact that any documents filed with the federal government, whether on the
scientists' own initiative or an audit or other lawful demand, are subject to FOIA." Id. at
1137. Thus, the lower court equated control with possession.
152. See Forsham,445 U.S. at 188-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 189-90.
154. Id. at 191-92. Justice Brennan pointed out that the government agencies were also
"deeply involved" with the records because they "remain with the grantee only at the
pleasure of the [g]overnment." Id. He feared that by relying on private grantees to perform
important government services, governments could avoid the FOIA if the courts do not
define "agency record" in a broader sense. See id.
Judge Bazelon, who dissented in the lower court opinion, also agreed that factors other
than simple possession should be considered in determining agency record status. See
Forsham, 587 F.2d at 1140 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). Because the government had an
unrestricted right of access to the records, provided all of the funding for the private
physicians group, and extensively relied on the study data, Judge Bazelon felt there was
sufficient government involvement with the data to create agency records. See id. The
funding, access, and reliance factors, taken together, established agency records in Judge
Bazelon's opinion. See id. at 1142.
Judge Bazelon also pointed out that records need not be located at the government
agency to be considered agency records because "[rlecords may be bailed to a privatelyowned warehouse, loaned to a private entity, or may have been sold or donated to the
[g]overnment but not delivered." Id. at 1144. The most determinative factor, in Judge
Bazelon's opinion, was the extreme reliance by the government on the data generated by the
private physicians, especially because it was a controversial study. See id.
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Committee for Freedom of the Press.5 5 In that case, the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press sought to gain access to records and
notes of Henry Kissinger's official telephone conversations made during
his service as Assistant to President Nixon for National Security Affairs
and as Secretary of State. 56 Holding that the records were not agency
records under the FOIA at the time of their creation because the Act does
not include the Office of the President, the Court reasoned that they did not
acquire agency record status when Kissinger transferred them to his office
at the State Department, an agency under the FOIA. 57
While the records were technically located at the FOIA agency, they
were not in the Department's official control because they were not used by
the Department for any purpose. Although the Forsham creation or
possession requirement was technically met, the KissingerCourt added the
additional requirement that the possession be for official purposes, creating
the two-prong official control test.' 59 The possession requirement must first
be met, but the records cannot be mere personal records located at an
agency. Instead, they must be used by the agency in the conduct of its
official duties.' 6 Because the records were personal to Kissinger and his
donee, the Library of Congress, the State Department did not have official
possession or control over the documents at the time of the FOIA
requests. 6'
The Court noted that it was not deciding at what point records that
relate to agency affairs become records of that agency. 62 However, noting
that the records related only to Kissinger's employment in the Office of the
President, the Court ruled that something more than the mere physical
location of records in a FOIA agency was needed, otherwise Kissinger's
"personal books, speeches, and all other memorabilia stored in his office
would have been agency records subject to disclosure under the FOIA."' 63
This would create public records out of personal information. In essence,
155.
156.
157.
158.

445 U.S. 136 (1980).
See id. at 139-40.
See id. at 156-57.
See id.

159. See id.
160. See id. at 157. The Court cited the Attorney General guidelines issued shortly after
Congress passed the FOIA, stating that the FOIA "refers, of course, only to records in being
and in the possession or control of an agency ...." See id. at 151 (emphasis added)
(citations omitted). Under the requirements laid out in Forsham and Tax Analysts, however,
there must be both possession and control-neither factor alone is sufficient to create
agency records.
161. See id. at 155.
162. See id. at 156.
163. Id. at 157.
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the Court was looking for official control by a FOIA
agency, which must
64
capacity.'
official
its
in
use
for
possession
include
The Supreme Court further solidified the official control test in
United States Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts 65 by focusing not only
on the creation or possession requirement, but also requiring that the
66
records be under the agency's control at the time of the FOIA request.'
There, the Court required the Tax Division of the Department of Justice to
make available to the public district court cases received while litigating
tax cases because the Department obtained the redords from the district
courts and was in control of the records when the FOIA requests were
made.' 67 The Court spelled out the two prongs of the official control test
laid out in Forsham and Kissinger: an agency must first create or obtain the
records and must be in control of the requested records at the time of the
FOIA request, meaning that "the materials have come into the agency's
possession in the legitimate conduct of its official duties. ' 68 Creation or
possession of the record is not enough without possession and official use
of the record at the time of the FOIA request.
In discussing both prongs of the official control test, the Court
emphasized that it was not restricting agency records to those actually
created within the FOIA agency. 16 The Court noted that FOIA agencies
frequently use privately-generated materials in performing their official
duties, and these materials are still a part of the decision-making process,
even if not created within the agency.170 The Court noted, however, that
agency records would not include personal materials in an agency
employee's possession; instead, they must be acquired by the agency itself

164. In his opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Stevens worried that
applying a strict possession and control approach would allow agencies to simply remove
documents from their physical possession and, therefore, frustrate the purposes behind the
FOIA. See id. at 161-62 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In fact,
Justice Stevens commented that the Court's strict possession approach "creates an incentive
for outgoing agency officials to remove potentially embarrassing documents from their files
in order to frustrate future FOIA requests." Id. at 161. In his opinion, an agency withholds a
record when it refuses to produce a record for which it has a legal right to possess or control.
See id. at 162. In other words, Justice Stevens would require an agency to produce records
in private hands if the records could legally be acquired by the agency. See id. at 164-65.
165. 492 U.S. 136 (1989).
166. See id. at 145.

167. See id. at 138.
168. Id. at 144-45.
169. See id. at 144.
170. See id.; Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979) (noting that FOIA
agencies frequently obtain potentially confidential information from private entities in the
course of doing business).
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in connection with its official business.17 1 In other words, creation or
possession alone would not satisfy the agency record test unless the agency
172
possessed the records for its own use at the time of the FOIA request.
There must be official control over the records, beyond mere physical
location at the agency.'73 Both prongs of the official control test must be
met.
The Court in Tax Analysts held that the district court tax opinions
were agency records because the they were both possessed and controlled
by the Department in the course of its official duties. It did not matter that
the cases were created by a nonagency under the FOIA. 74 The FOIA's goal
should be to give the public access to records received by an agency in
conducting its business, regardless of the actual author of the records.'75
The Court reiterated the threshold requirement of creation or possession,
but it also required more than just possession-the records must be located
at the FOIA agency and be a part of its official business at the time of the
FOIA request.
2.

The Lower Court Control Approaches

Lower federal courts have also required some degree of control over a
record by a FOIA agency in the conduct of its official duties in order to
make the record an agency record. In Berry v. Departmentof Justce,7 7 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that presentence reports prepared by
the courts for use by the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Parole
Commission, both FOIA agencies, were agency records when in the
possession of the agencies for their official use. 177 The records were not
court documents, which would not be subject to the FOIA, because they
were in the possession of agencies, used in their official duties, and subject
to the free disposition of the agencies. 17 Therefore, they were agency
171. See Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. at 145 (citing Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of Press, 445 U.S. 136, 157 (1980)); Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 136, 183 (1980).
172. See Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. at 145.
173. See id. at 143-45.
174. See id. at 146-47. The Court noted that disputes over control should be infrequent,
but that it was "leaving for another day" those cases where records are "purposefully routed
. .. out of agency possession in order to circumvent [an impending] FOIA request," or
"wrongfully removed by an individual after a request is filed." Id. at 146 n.61 (quoting
Kissinger,445 U.S. at 155 n.9).
175. See id. at 147.
176. 733 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1984).
177. See id. at 1344.
178. See id. at 1346; Crooker v. United States Parole Comm'n, 760 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1985) (holding presentence reports used by the U.S. Parole Commission are agency
records); Carson v. United States Dep't of Justice, 631 F.2d 1008, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
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records because they were within the official control of the agencies.
The court in Berry followed Supreme Court precedent by holding that
creation alone is not dispositive of the control test. 7 9 Otherwise, all
documents of nonagencies would be shrouded in secrecy. ° If the records
are possessed by the agency, the court stated they could still be subject to
access as agency records even if they were originally created by a
nonagency because they essentially become a part of government
business.181 The court relied on an official control test focusing on whether
the records are in the possession of an agency and "prepared substantially
to be relied upon in agency decisionmaking [sic].' 8 2 Possession by the
agency is a prerequisite, but the record must also reflect how an agency
conducts its official duties. 3 Since presentence reports are routinely
prepared by courts and forwarded to the federal agencies for use in their
duties, the reports were agency records because they were both in the
possession of the agencies and within their control.' 84 Therefore, in keeping
with the official control approach solidified in the Supreme Court cases
ending with Tax Analysts, the Berry court required both possession and
control."'
(finding that presentence reports prepared by the probation service but in the possession of
the Parole Commission, a FOIA agency, are central to the Commission's primary function
and are therefore agency records); cf Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(holding that Congress had not relinquished its control over documents even though they
were in the temporary possession of the CIA; thus, the CIA did not have sufficient control
over the records to render them agency records).
179. See Berry, 733 F.2d at 1348; see also Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 136, 181 (1980)
(stating that "[r]ecords of a nonagency certainly could become agency records as well.").
180. See Berry, 733 F.2d at 1348.
181. See id. at 1350. The court stressed the record's creation for agency decision making
as important for disclosure, but it also suggested that data created outside the agency but
possessed by the agency could also be subject to access, particularly if other factors such as
federal funding are involved. See id. at 1350 n.10.
182. Id. at 1349.
183. See id. at 1350.
184. See id. at 1350-51.
185. See Burka v. United States Dep't. of Health and Human Services, 87 F.3d 508 (D.C.
Cir. 1996). The court held that data tapes and questionnaires regarding smoking habits and
attitudes conducted at the direction of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
by the National Cancer Institute and a private company were agency records because HHS
exercised extensive control over the data and documents were created on behalf of HHS.
Also, the National Cancer Institute planned to take possession of the materials and use them
in its official duties. See id. at 515.
In essence, this case contrasts Forsham, where the federal agency did not have the
extensive control over the private entity study present in Burka. See Forsham v. Harris, 445
U.S. 169 (1980). In Burka, a federal agency assisted in the creation of the records, and
another federal agency exercised extensive day-to-day control over the study. See Burka, 87
F.3d at 515. In short, the entities were agencies under the Forsham approach, and their
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Similar to the Berry court's approach, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in General Electric Co. v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission1 6 held that the term "agency record" covers not
only documents created by a federal agency, but also documents submitted
to the agency for use in its official duties.' 87 Otherwise, the court reasoned
that the purpose behind the FOIA-"to give the public access to
information on which the government bases action"--would be impeded if
agency records excluded documents that moved the agency to act and were
possessed by the agency. This reasoning resulted in the conclusion that a
record compiled during a nuclear licensing proceeding was an agency
record used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), a FOIA
agency, even though the record was prepared by General Electric, a private
company.' This was because the NRC had possession and control over the
document for its official use, which satisfied the two prongs of the official

control test.
Other federal courts also used an official control test in determining
what records are subject to the FOIA. In Teich v. Food and Drug
Administration,90 the court held that a summary of consumer complaints
about a private manufacturer's breast implants was an agency record
subject to the FOIA because it was filed with the FDA, an agency under the
Act, and was obtained as part of the FDA's official duties. The court
based its decision on a finding that the FDA was conducting its official
business when it requested documents from Dow Coming regarding breast
implants.' 2 Therefore, it was irrelevant whether the FDA planned to return
records would eventually be under the official control of HHS. See id.
186. 750 F.2d 1394 (7th Cir. 1984).
187. See id. at 1400.
188. Id.; see also Weisberg v. United States Dep't. of Justice, 631 F.2d 824, 828 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (discussing purposes behind FOIA); NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437
U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (discussing purposes behind FOIA).
189. See General Electric Co., 750 F.2d at 1400. The court added that even though the
Commission did not rely extensively on the report, it was still an agency record. See id. This
was because the public still had an interest in knowing what portions of the report the
Commission relied on and what exact uses it made of the report. See id.
190. 751 F. Supp. 243 (D.D.C. 1990).
191. Seeid. at248.
192. See id.; see also Ryan v. Department of Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
("Unless there is evidence of control by some other entity, [the court] must conclude that
[the agency] controls these documents"); Na Iwi 0 Na Kupuna 0 Mokapu v. Dalton, 894 F.
Supp. 1397, 1411 (D. Haw. 1995) (holding that inventory of Native American that remains
under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act was an agency record
because the Secretary of the Navy contracted for and obtained the inventory, and it was in
the federal agency's control indefinitely); see generallyRush v. Department of State, 716 F.
Supp. 598 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (holding that documents possessed by the Department of State
regarding negotiations on the status of Berlin were agency records since the Department was
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the documents, Sas• long
as they were possessed by the Agency and used in
193
its official business. The two prongs of the official control test were met.
In contrast, the Southern District of New York in Ciba-Geigy Corp. v.
Mathews194 provided extensive reasoning for why records of a university
research group, which was not an agency under the FOIA,'9 ' were not
agency records. The court stated that it was not shown that the records were
controlled or substantially utilized by a federal agency under the Act."'
Because agency records reach only records owned or controlled by the
government agency and used in its official business, the court reasoned that
"it must appear that there was significant [g]overnment involvement with
the records themselves in order to deem them agency records."' 97
The district court first held that government funding alone would not
make the underlying private research data agency records.'" Otherwise, all
entities gaining regular federal government support would be subject to
disclosure, an effect that would chill research progress. 199 Additionally, the
data produced by the entity was intended to be private research data. The
data remained in control of the private entity and the government did not
exercise any dominion over the data. 20 Lastly, while the FDA relied on
reports submitted by the private grantees, it did not rely on the underlying
data.20 ' Thus, funding, access, and partial reliance were insufficient to
the only entity in control of the documents since obtaining them in 1977).
193. See Teich, 751 F. Supp. at 248. Additionally, the court seemed troubled by the fact
that the FDA itself attempted to determine that the documents were not agency records by
promising confidentiality during the review process. See id. at 248. In effect, the court stated
that the FDA was attempting to evade the Act by making this information regarding breast
implants, which was of extreme importance to the public, confidential by its own
determination. See id. at 249. The court would not allow this agency determination of
confidentiality. See id.
194. 428 F. Supp. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
195. Since the research group had no independent authority to perform government
functions, no legal authority to make decisions, and was not under any federal control, the
group is not an agency under the Act. Its only power was to make recommendations to
federal agencies, not decisions. See id. at 528; see generally Wolfe v. Weinberger, 403 F.
Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding that an FDA advisory review panel played an important
part in the FDA's decision-making process, but it was still not an agency under the Act
because it was empowered only to make recommendations, not decisions, for the FDA). See
discussion supraPart IV.A.
196. See Ciba-Geigy, 428 F. Supp. at 529.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 530; Lombardo v. Handler, 397 F. Supp. 792, 802 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding
that substantial federal funding did not make the National Academy of Sciences subject to
the FOIA because it was not controlled by the government and its studies were not
conducted as an adjunct to government operations).
199. See Ciba-Geigy, 428 F. Supp. at 530.
200. See id. at 530-31.
201. See id. at 531; see also Illinois Inst. for Continuing Legal Educ. v. United States
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create agency records without some actual government agency possession
and control in an official capacity. 2
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Ciba-Geigy
court's reasoning in Wolfe v. Departmentof Health and Human Services. 3
In Wolfe, the Federal Circuit Court held that a report prepared by the
President-elect's transition team regarding the HHS was not an agency
record because HHS did not create or maintain control over the documents,
even though two copies were physically located at the Department. 204 The
court reasoned that the agency must have possession of documents in order
to have obtained them, but there must also be some nexus between the
agency and the documents other than the mere incidence of location.
Similar to Kissinger,the mere fact that two of the documents were "within
the four walls of the agency" was not enough to turn the documents into
agency records without official use by the FOIA agency. 206
Although an individual brought the documents within the four walls
of H-S, the court stated that they were not integrated into the agency's
files or records. 207 In other words, they did not become official records of
the agency itself and were not used by the agency in its official business.
Physical location provided the only nexus between the private documents
and the agency, and this would not create agency records absent possession
by the agency in its official capacity, the second prong of the official
control test.2°8 Documents must still retain their private character even
Dep't. of Labor, 545 F. Supp. 1229, 1233-35 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding that a two-volume
briefing book on the Department of Labor (DOL) prepared by the President-elect's
transition staff, a nonagency under the FOIA, was not an agency record). The court based its
opinion on the fact that the book was only possessed by an official at the DOL, which
offered an insufficient nexus to establish control. See id.
202. See Ciba-Geigy, 428 F. Supp. at 531. The court stressed that "[m]ere access without
ownership and mere reliance without control will not suffice to convert the [private entity's]
data into agency data." Id. The research data was never turned over to the FDA; instead, it
was prepared according to the methods of the private grantee, and the documents only
passed into the FDA's hands at a particular point in time, not on a permanent basis. See id.
Although private documents directly relied upon or memoranda expressly adopted by an
agency are subject to disclosure even if created by a private entity, the government agency
did not expressly rely on or adopt the underlying data created by a private research group.
See id. at 532.
203. 711 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
204. See id. at 1078-81.
205. See id. at 1079-80.
206. Id. at 1080.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 1080-81; cf. Ryan v. Department of Justice, 617 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(holding that Attorney General's possession of documents was tantamount to possession by
the Justice Department because the Attorney General possessed the documents during his
tenure in his official capacity, therefore the Department had control over the documents).
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though they may relate to an agency's business, as long as they remain
within the exclusive control of the private individual and do not become a
209
part of the agency's business. In short, the court followed the official
control approach laid out by the Supreme Court in determining the reach of
agency records under the FOIA, wherein both prongs must be present to
satisfy the test. 2
Federal courts construing the undefined "agency record" term under
the FOIA therefore looked at creation or possession as a threshold
requirement, but also required more than just physical location at the
agency to establish the second prong of the official control test. Some type
of control by the agency, comprising not only of possession but also of use
in an official capacity by the agency, is required in order for the records to
be considered agency records. This control provides the necessary link
between the agency and the record to establish the agency's control over
the record required by the Supreme Court, potentially allowing private
entities to be covered under the FOIA.
The next Part focuses on the likelihood that courts allow public access
to records of private entity and analyzes the various federal court
approaches in light of the purposes behind the FOIA. In this way, the
effects of federal privatization on freedom of information can be shown.
V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE AGENCY AND RECORD APPROACHES
In applying the FOIA to private entities, federal courts have
jurisdiction to grant relief only to requesters who have been denied access

209. See Wolfe, 711 F.2d at 1081. The documents in Wolfe did not become a part of the
agency's official business because they were never integrated into the agency's files and
were not used by the agency in any way. See id. at 1080. Additionally, the court took the
approach in Forsham by ruling that access to the documents by the agency alone would not
create agency records unless the agency in fact exercised this ability to access the records.
See id.; see also Illinois Inst. for Continuing Educ. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 545 F.
Supp. 1229, 1233-35 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (finding that the documents of the transition team
were not agency records because they had never been used by the agency).
210. See Katz v. National Archives & Records Admin., 862 F. Supp. 476, 479-80
(D.D.C. 1994) (holding that autopsy photographs of President John F. Kennedy were not
agency records because, even though they were created and possessed by a government
agency, they were never officially used for government business, and the Kennedy family
retained control over the photographs); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. National
Mediation Bd., 712 F.2d 1495, 1496 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding that National Mediation
Board's possession of labels bearing names of employees eligible to vote did not constitute
control over the labels because possession was limited to one-time attachment of labels
subject to a court order); Martin Marietta Aluminum, Inc. v. Administrator, Gen. Servs.
Admin., 444 F. Supp. 945, 948-49 (D.C. Cal. 1977) (holding that documents created by
private consultants at the request of the agency were agency records because they were
prepared for the agency and officially "usedby the agency).
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and can show that an agency has improperly withheld agency records.2 1' As
this Article demonstrates, interpreting the FOJA's definition of "agency"
and deciding what falls under the term "agency records" have been difficult
tasks for the federal courts. While they have some guidance from Congress
on defining "agency,"212 the definition of "agency record" has been left

solely to the judiciary. Narrow definitions of these terms will effectively
create a tenth exemption to the FOIA, allowing government agencies to
farm out services to private entities and keep those services shrouded in
213
secrecy.
At the same time, it has been argued that an expansive FOIA could

hurt the government's ability to seek services from private entities not
wishing to deal with public scrutiny and could violate business privacy
interests when private entities are required to submit confidential
information to the government. 214 Thus, a balance needs to be achieved to
protect the nongovernmental information held by private entities, but at the
same time, allow access to information created or held by private entities
that clearly relates to governmental operations. 215 The question posed by
this Article asks what approach to defining "agency" and "agency record"
would best protect the public's right to know and comport with the spirit of
the FOJA.
The FOJA was clearly meant to open the workings of the government
to public scrutiny. 216 But the diversification of the operations of government
in this century has made it harder for the public to find out what its
government is doing.217 Because the Act's purpose is to open up agency
211. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142 (1989).
212. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (Supp. 111996).
213. See, e.g., Cdsarez, supra note 3, at 293 ("When a federal agency delegates a public
function to a private contractor, the agency, in effect, frustrates the purpose of the FOIA.");
O'Connell, supra note 75, at 627 ("If nonacquisition of nonagency records and transfer of
agency records to a nonagency are legitimate means of avoiding [the] FOIA disclosure, then
agency officials will be tempted to contract out sensitive agency business... they wish to
shield from public view."); Wion, supra note 14, at 1095 ("[A] narrow definition of 'agency
records' .. . risks both expanding the exemption to the Act ... and obstructing Congress's
goal of obtaining 'the fullest responsible disclosure."').
214. See, e.g., Cdsarez, supra note 3, at 292; Fred H. Cate et al., The Right to Privacy
andthe Public'sRight to Know: The "CentralPurpose" of the Freedom of Information Act,
46 ADMIN. L. REv. 41, 43-44 (1994) (discussing the use of the FOIA to gain access to
information concerning competitors).
215. C~sarez essentially makes this argument when she states that the FOIA could
mandate too much disclosure of private business information, but, at the same time, protect
too much information that relates to governmental functions. See C.sarez, supra note 3, at
292-93.
216. See S. REP. No. 89-813 at 3 (1965); KENT R. MIDDLETON & BILL F. CHAMBERLIN,
THE LAw OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS

455 (3d ed. 1994).

217. See Cdsarez, supra note 3, at 264-65.
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decision making to public scrutiny, it becomes necessary to limit its
exemptions to protect the public's right to know.2 18 By creating narrow
definitions for "agency" and "agency records'"-the Act's threshold
requirements-however, it is possible that the courts could broaden the
Act's exemptions and shield information directly relevant to agency
decision making from the public eye. In other words, courts can frustrate
219
the Act's core purpose.
In 1974, Congress amended the FOIA to effectively broaden its
definition of "agency., 220 The legislative history of the 1974 amendments to
the FOIA make clear that the definition of "agency" was meant to reach
entities that "perform governmental functions and control information of
interest to the public." 221 However, courts interpreting the 1974 definition
seemingly ignored this congressional statement by construing the term
"agency" more narrowly than the congressional intent would suggest. By
defining "agency" to mean governmental control over the private entity or
222
legal decision-making authority of the entity, it can be argued that courts
have ignored some entities that may control information of interest to the
public.
Because courts defined "agency" to mean an entity that is the
functional equivalent of the government, they left out other entities that
may perform government functions and control public information but do
not make decisions for the government and are not completely controlled
by the government. A good example of the function of these definitions is
organizations that perform important research functions for governmental
agencies, but do not make government decisions and are not controlled by
the government. These organizations would clearly be performing a
function that the government would otherwise perform itself, and they
would certainly possess information of potential interest to the public.
However, they would not be considered agencies under the courts'
interpretation of the FOIA.
Unless the entities themselves make decisions for the government or
218. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988) (stating that the
FOIA's exemptions must be "narrowly construed").
219. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. It is important to note that courts must
function within the limitations of the FOIA's definition of "agency," as described in supra
Part III.A, as well as the somewhat vague definition of "record" described in supra Part
III.B. However, Congress specifically intended the definition of "agency" to include entities
that "perform governmental functions and control information of interest to the public."
H.R. REP. No. 93-876, at 8-9 (1974). Therefore, it is arguable that the courts could read the
federal statute more broadly than requiring both possession and control.
220. See H.R. REP. No. 93-876, at 8-9 (1974).
221. Id.
222. See supra Part IV.A.
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are controlled by the government, they are not covered by the judicial
interpretation of agency. This is true even if the government substantially
bases its important decisions on private entity's information. 2 3 It would
also be true even if the private entity is performing important governmental
services but is not controlled by or making decisions for the government.224
In both of these situations, it can be argued that the entity is performing a
government function or, at least, controlling information of interest to the
public. As another example, the private entity could be operating a federal
prison, but the public would know nothing about its operations under a
225
narrow "agency" definition.
Similarly, a narrow definition of "agency record" leads to decisions
that appear to conflict with the FOIA's legislative history, as well as the
purpose of letting the public know what its government is doing. An
approach based on possession of the record is arguably a narrow definition
of "agency record" because it could exclude records directly dealing with a
governmental agency or information affecting the public but held outside
the agency. 226 An approach based on possession and control is even
narrower because it requires more than simple possession; it requires the

223. For example, the medical foundation at issue in Public Citizen Health Research
Group was under contract with the HEW to conduct professional standards reviews of
doctors under the Medicare and Medicaid programs. See Public Citizen Health Research
Group v. Department of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 668 F.2d 537, 538-39 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
The purpose of this program was to review the appropriateness, necessity, and quality of
medical services under the Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement programs and PRSO
findings were to guide government decisions regarding the future operations of the
programs. See id. However, because the group was private and did not directly make
decisions for the government, it was not an agency, even though it held important
information regarding federal programs of direct interest to the public. See id. at 543.
224. For example, the group of private physicians in Forsham were performing an
important service for the government, with government funding. The group was conducting
a long-term study on the effectiveness of diabetes treatment programs that was to be very
important to the NIAMDD, a federal agency, and was to be the basis of future decisions of
the NIAMDD. See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 172 (1980). Even though this
information was important and of interest to the public, the private group was not an agency
because the government did not control their day-to-day operations, and the group did not
make decisions for the government. See id. at 178-80.
225. See generally,Cdsarez, supra note 3.
226. For example, the information in Forsham concerned federal treatment regimens and
was designed for use by the federal government. Nonetheless, the records were not agency
records because they were not created or obtained by the federal government, even though
the information had public interest. See Forsham, 445 U.S. at 186. The private research
information in Ciba-Geigy also had public interest because it dealt with FDA labeling of
drugs, and it was to be used by the FDA. See Ciba-Geigy v. Matthews, 428 F. Supp. 523,
526 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But the records were not agency records because substantial use or
control was not present, even with the information's potential effect on the public. See id. at
528-30.
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additional elements of use or reliance. 227 This official control definition of
"agency record" therefore permits government to keep important public
228
information secret by relinquishing possession or control of the records.
Even though the entity may be performing a government function and
controlling important public information, this approach would keep its
records out of the public eye unless the FOIA agency actually possesses
and uses the documents.
These cramped "agency" and "agency records" definitions could
certainly be remedied by one sweep of the legislature's pen. It is possible
that Congress could amend the definition of "agency" under the FOIA229 to
include entities that are performing functions for federal agencies and
controlling information directly relevant to agency functions and to the
public. Additionally, Congress should at long last define the term "agency
records," making it broad enough to include records directly relating to
governmental agency functions, even if they are not possessed by a
governmental agency and are not under its direct control. The important
inquiry is whether the records relate to government, not technical issues of
who is in possession and control of the records. If the records relate to
government functions, they should be public records. Therefore, Congress
should amend the FOIA to ensure that federal agencies cannot violate its
spirit by simply transferring their important functions and records to an
outside private entity.
In the absence of a congressional amendment to the FOIA, however,
the federal courts should develop more flexible definitions of "agency" and
"agency record" to protect the public's right to information. In his Forsham
dissent, Justice Brennan advocated a more flexible approach that would
weigh "the importance of the record" based on the "understanding of
[g]overnmental activities" it offered, as well as the agency's use of the
230
information in the record. Courts would do well to protect the public's
right to find out what its government is up to by adopting Justice Brennan's
approach because this would focus on the nature of the record itself, rather
than looking at where the record is located, who has control over it, and the
technical nature of the agency that created it. This new approach would
make the record public simply because it relates directly to the government,
and thus it is of obvious importance to the public.
227. Similarly, the information in Kissingerwas arguably personal information because
it was kept at the Department of State and could have been of direct relevance to the
public's interest in knowing more about the operations of the Nixon presidency. See
Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 141-43 (1980).
228. See O'Connell, supra note 75, at 627.
229. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1) (Supp. II 1996).
230. Forsham,445 U.S. at 189 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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In short, Congress should clarify its 1974 definition of "agency" laid
out in the FOIA23' to include private entities controlling information of
interest to the public, and the term "agency record" should be defined
similarly through a congressional mandate. 2 In absence of this action by
Congress, however, the judiciary is left with some discretion in upholding
the spirit of the Act while protecting the rights of private parties. Two
approaches would arguably allow more access to important public
information, either through a public function definition of "agency" or a
focus on the public nature of the record itself in determining whether it
should be termed an "agency record."
A.

The Public FunctionApproach

One approach to interpreting the Act's definition more broadly could
be through a test focusing on the nature of the function performed by the
agency. As the plaintiffs argued in Forsham, if the entity is performing a
function for the government, and the results will clearly be used by the
government, the public should have a right to access. 33 Commentators
discussed this public function approach as an extension of the U.S.
Supreme Court's state action concept, where entities performing functions
for the government are deemed state actors for constitutional purposes.2M
Arguably, if these entities can be termed "state actors" under the
Constitution, they should be subject to access as governmental agencies
under the FOIA.35
This public function approach to state action has been endorsed by the
U.S. Supreme Court in cases where a private entity was performing
functions exclusively administered by the state or city, such as the upkeep

231. See 5 U.S.C. §552 (f)(1); discussion supra Part II.A.
232. See, e.g., Cdsarez, supra note 3, at 296-97. Additionally, O'Connell suggests that a
more flexible approach to defining "agency record" is to include in the definition when an
agency "clearly has the legal right to determine the ultimate disposition of records-whether
they remain within its possession or not-agency control over those records is conclusively
established." O'Connell, supra note 75, at 629. In other words, where the agency has a right
to the record (as opposed to the actual exercise of that right as required by Forsham), and its
right is dominant over the private entity, the record is an agency record. See id. This control
test is more flexible than the one used by federal courts because it focuses on rights to the
document, as opposed to the actual exercise of those rights.
233. See Forsham v. Califano, 587 F.2d 1128, 1133-35 (D.C. Cir. 1978), affd, Forshan
v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 (1980).
234. See Bunker & Davis, supra note 3, at 18-24; see generally Barak-Erez, supra note
53; ROBBINS, supra note 26, at 82-94 (discussing the development of the public function
approach in the Supreme Court).
235. See Barak-Erez, supra note 53, at 1190 (operating in the public domain should
serve to make private entities government actors).
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of streets and roads, sewage disposal, and other public accommodations.
However, unless the function was exclusively administered by a state or
city, the Court refused to find state action in cases beginning in the
1970s. 237 Thus, even if this public function approach became a part of the
FOIA determination of agency status, it is possible that governments could
delegate services to private entities and still avoid the reach of the Act, as
long as those
•238services are not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the
government. This has led commentators to criticize the Supreme Court's
approach to public function status and to comment that services previously
operated by the government do not lose their importance when delegated to
239
private entities.
It is possible that a private entity could be subject to the FOIA's
definition of "agency" if it is a delegated function by the government, and
if it has the power of the state (dealing with public health and welfare) or
where its methods of judgment are particularly important to the public,
such as tax collection.20 If the state delegates a function that affects the

236. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1978) (finding that
functions exclusively administered by the state or city, such as education, fire and police
protection, and tax collection, are more likely to result in a finding of state action when they
are delegated to a private entity); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 178-79
(1972) (finding state action where the state regulatory scheme required a private club to
adhere to its own discriminatory by-laws in order to maintain its liquor license); Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding that private discrimination of
restaurant owner turned into state action because the restaurant owner was a lessee in a
publicly-funded parking garage that was owned by the Wilmington Parking Auth., an
agency of the State of Delaware);. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (finding a town
operated by private company was by all appearances no different than any other public
town, and thus the company could not deny a Jehovah's Witness her First Amendment
rights; town was operating for the public's benefit and was performing a public function,
therefore it was subject to state regulation). These cases show how the acts of private
entities can become acts of the state when they are sufficiently under state control or acting
within the purview of the state. Arguably, the same amount of state control can be found in
many contracting out situations for purposes of the FOIA, and in other cases, the private
entity is performing a necessary public function for the government and therefore has a
close relationship with the state that should allow public access.
237. See, e.g., Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 160-63 (1978) (settling disputes between debtors
and creditors is not an exclusive state function, thus there was no state action); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358-59 (1974) (finding a monopoly utility company
was not subject to constitutional due process requirements because utilities are not
exclusively provided by the state).
238. For example, research functions and health care may not be traditionally exclusive
state functions, but prison operation may be considered an exclusive function. Thus, it is
possible that some "essential services" could be included in this new agency definition,
while other important public services are still left out of the definition. See Bunker & Davis,
supra note 3, at 21-22.
239. See id. at 22; Mays, supra note 17, at 69.
240. See Bunker & Davis, supra note 3, at 23; Two Cheers for Privatization, in
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public welfare and makes the need for accountability high, it can be argued
that the entity is performing a public function and should be a state actor
for all purposes, including the FOIA.241 This definition of "agency" is in
line with the Act's purpose of allowing access to entities that "perform
governmental functions and control information of interest to the public,"
242
such as private prison operators and health care entities.
B.

The Nature of Records Approach

Additionally, if the record relates in any way to government
operations or is used in any way by the government agency, it could be an
agency record under the FOIA. In essence, this approach would make the
substance of the record paramount, as opposed to the nature of the agency.
This approach comports with Justice Brennan's view that the issue is "the
importance of the record to an understanding of [g]overnment activities. 243
Even if the entity does not fall under the FOIA, the record should still be an
agency record if it has to do with the official functions of government. This
should be true because even if the entity is not performing a governmental
function, it would still be controlling information relating to the
government and information of interest to the public. 244
This nature of records approach would better square with the
underlying core purpose of the FOIA-the public's interest in knowing
about agency operations-than the more cramped official control definition
of "agency record" that often leaves important government-related
information shrouded in secrecy. Additionally, it is an approach that is even
more favorable to disclosure of important public information than the
public function approach because it looks at the subject of the record itself,
instead of focusing on the nature of the entity's function. As long as the
record relates to a governmental function, it is public.245
In short, the narrower definitions of "agency" and "agency record"
PRIVATIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 310 (William T. Gormley

ed., 1991).
241. See Bunker & Davis, supra note 3, at 24; see generally CIsarez, supra note 3.
242. H.R. REP. No. 93-876 at. 8-9 (1974).
243. Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 189 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
244. See H.R. REP. No. 93-876, at 8-9 (1974).
245. It should be noted that the public function approach could be equally favorable to
access, however, because most private entities of interest to the public will be performing
services for the public's health and welfare. However, it is conceivable that there is a public
interest in some operations that are not vital to the general public's health and welfare, such
as some research operations. Although the public cares about how its money is spent, some
operations do not have a direct impact on the public at large. Treatment of prisoners could
fall under this classification. Nonetheless, the nature of records approach would make these
records public because they relate to a previous governmental function, without the
necessity of scrutinizing the entity itself.
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allow governmental agencies to use privatization of either governmental
functions or record-keeping services to avoid disclosure under the FOIA.
Without some flexibility through either a public function or nature of
records approach, governmental privatization will result in exactly the
opposite of the Act's intention-to avoid the evils of a secret government.
VI. CONCLUSION
The FOIA was meant to ensure that the public would always be able
to keep track of the events happening behind governmental agency doors.
But in an age of privatization of governmental services in the name of
efficiency, the Act needs to be adapted to ensure that its original purpose
remains sound. Thus far, courts have not kept pace with this purpose by
interpreting agency and agency record under the Act too narrowly. This
may very well result in government secrecy as services are farmed out to
entities not covered under the Act, and then the records are used but never
technically controlled by the government.
The fact that the governmental agency does not control the
information in a technical sense, or that the private entity is not acting as
the functional equivalent of the government, does not make the information
any less important to the public. The information relates directly to public
functions, such as the FDA, HEW, and other governmental agencies. But
by privatizing, cases show that the government can avoid the disclosure
requirements under the FOIA.
Unless Congress steps in with more specific definitions of "agency"
and "agency record" under the Act, it is up to the courts to protect the
public's right to know by using a test that focuses on the public function of
the entity or the nature of the information in its records, rather than their
technical location or the attributes of the entity holding them. In the end, if
the records pertain to the government, they are of interest to the public and
should be opened for scrutiny. By using the nature of records approach,
courts would best keep the "curtains of secrecy" from being pulled around
246
public information.

246. Statement by President Lyndon B. Johnson Upon Signing Bill Revising Public
Information Provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, July 4, 1966, 2 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 895 (July 11, 1966).

